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ABSTRACT
The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment affords the “accused” in
“criminal prosecutions” the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against”
them. A particular challenge for courts over at least the last decade-plus has
been the degree to which the Confrontation Clause applies to forensic reports,
such as those presenting the results of a DNA, toxicology, or other CSI-type
analysis. Should use of forensic reports entitle criminal defendants to confront
purportedly “objective” analysts from the lab producing the report? If so,
which analyst or analysts? For forensic processes that require multiple analysts, should the prosecution be required to produce each and every analyst
involved in handling the sample, participating in the testing process, or making any type of even minor representation contained in the report? Although
the Supreme Court has had several occasions to opine on the application of
the Confrontation Clause to forensic reports, and although such precedent
suggests criminal defendants enjoy at least some right to confront a forensic
analyst, a great deal of uncertainty persists as to which analyst or analysts
must be produced in cases involving multiple analysts. A certiorari petition
considered by the Supreme Court in March 2021—Chavis v. Delaware—
could have permitted the Court to address this multi-analyst problem. Even
though the Court determined Chavis was not the appropriate vehicle for
resolving the multi-analyst problem, this is an extremely important issue for
labs, local stakeholders, and lower courts, and Justice Gorsuch even dissented
from the Court’s denial of certiorari. The purpose of this Article is to identify
and discuss six plausible approaches the Supreme Court could consider in
resolving the multi-analyst problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine Detective Harry Bosch of Hollywood Homicide has investigated the murder of a famous actress and her boyfriend. Bosch has
identified who he believes to be the killer, and the key piece of evidence linking the accused to the double murder is a DNA match between a swab taken from the accused and a DNA sample from the
crime scene, the actress’s chateau in the Hollywood Hills. A wellknown private forensic lab outside of California handled the DNA
analysis. The District Attorney’s Office has just advised Bosch that,
under the Confrontation Clause (the “Clause”) in the Federal Constitution and relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the accused will
likely have the right to confront and cross-examine an analyst from
the forensic lab. Even though Bosch has been working Hollywood
Homicide for many years, he is now perplexed. He believes more than
five analysts may have been involved in the forensic DNA analysis
process, with some likely performing only very minor roles. Could this
mean that, unless each and every one of those analysts appears to testify at the accused’s trial, the accused could walk?
The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment affords the “accused” in “criminal prosecutions” the right “to be confronted with the
witnesses against” them.1 The difficulty has come in determining when
the Clause applies in a given case. Since Crawford v. Washington, the
Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause applies only in
cases involving a certain subset of out-of-court statements which could
be considered equivalent to “bear[ing] testimony” in court.2 Such socalled “testimonial” statements of declarants not testifying at trial are
“admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”3 However,
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to confront also applies to states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965); see also David
L. Faigman et al., Gatekeeping Science: Using the Structure of Scientific Research to
Distinguish Between Admissibility and Weight in Expert Testimony, 110 NW. U. L.
REV. 859, 876 (2016).
2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
3. Id. at 59.
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Crawford and its progeny have not fully defined what statements are
“testimonial.”4
A particular challenge for courts over at least the last decade-plus
has been the degree to which the Confrontation Clause applies to forensic reports, such as those presenting the results of a DNA, toxicology, or other CSI-type analysis. Should use of forensic reports entitle
criminal defendants to confront purportedly “objective” analysts from
the lab producing the report? If so, which analyst or analysts? For
forensic processes which require multiple analysts, should the prosecution be required to produce each and every analyst involved in handling the sample, participating in the testing process, or making any
type of even minor representation contained in the report? Although
the Supreme Court has had several occasions to opine on the application of the Confrontation Clause to forensic reports, and although
such precedent suggests criminal defendants enjoy at least some right
to confront a forensic analyst, a great deal of uncertainty persists as to
which analyst or analysts must be produced in cases involving multiple
analysts.5
A certiorari petition considered by the Supreme Court in March
2021—Chavis v. Delaware—could have permitted the Court to address this multi-analyst problem.6 In Chavis, the prosecution was permitted to offer the results of forensic DNA analysis—produced by a
4. See infra Part II. “Testimonial” statements would seem to include “out-ofcourt written or oral statements meant or understood to provide some form of evidence for use at trial, especially if made solemnly and to a state actor or agent.”
Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, A Game of Katso and Mouse: Current Theories for Getting Forensic Analysis Evidence Past the Confrontation Clause, 57 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 27, 27 (2020) [hereinafter A Game of Katso and Mouse].
5. See Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 305 (2009); Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 647 (2011); Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 50 (2012)
(plurality opinion); see also Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing “confusion” in this area and first citing State v. Dotson, 450
S.W.3d 1, 68 (Tenn. 2014); then citing State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 666 (N.J. 2014);
then citing United States v. Turner, 709 F.3d 1187, 1189 (7th Cir. 2013); and then
citing United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 94 (2d Cir. 2013)); Ronald J. Coleman &
Paul F. Rothstein, Grabbing the Bullcoming by the Horns: How the Supreme Court
Could Have Used Bullcoming v. New Mexico to Clarify Confrontation Clause Requirements for CSI-Type Reports, 90 NEB. L. REV. 502, 546 (2011) [hereinafter Grabbing the Bullcoming]; Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, Williams v. Illinois and
the Confrontation Clause, PUBLICSQUARE.NET (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.public
square.net/2011/12/williams-v-illinois-confrontation-clause/ [https://perma.cc/4KP37F2E] [hereinafter Williams and the Confrontation Clause]; Paul F. Rothstein, Unwrapping the Box the Supreme Court Justices Have Gotten Themselves into: Internal
Confrontations Over Confronting the Confrontation Clause, 58 HOW. L.J. 479, 479
(2015) [hereinafter Unwrapping the Box]; A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4,
at 27; Andrew Arons, Comment, Who Must Testify?: The Limits of the Confrontation
Clause When It Is Applied to Forensic Laboratory Reports, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 721,
723 (2013) (discussing who the prosecution must call to testify after offering “a forensic laboratory report against a criminal defendant”).
6. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chavis v. Delaware, 141 S. Ct.
1528 (2021) (No. 20-317), 2020 WL 5498422.
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process involving multiple analysts—through the testimony of a single
lab analyst.7 This testifying analyst’s report and testimony relied on
her conclusion that other analysts at the lab had performed their work
properly, but her conclusion was based on a review of such other analysts’ entries in case files rather than on personal knowledge.8 The
Delaware Supreme Court found that this did not violate the Confrontation Clause,9 and notwithstanding Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari.10 Was the Delaware Supreme
Court’s conclusion in Chavis correct, and how should courts handle
the multi-analyst problem in future cases?
This Article identifies and discusses six plausible approaches the
U.S. Supreme Court may consider in addressing the multi-analyst
problem. The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II
provides relevant background on the Confrontation Clause, including
the challenge posed by forensic reports; Part III describes the Chavis
case and petition; Part IV presents our six approaches for addressing
the multi-analyst problem; and Part V concludes and speculates as to
which of our six approaches the Supreme Court would be most likely
to prefer.
II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE BACKGROUND
Before Crawford v. Washington,11 Confrontation Clause cases were
analyzed under the regime established in Ohio v. Roberts.12 Under
Roberts, a non-testifying declarant’s hearsay statement could only be
admitted against a criminal defendant if the declarant was unavailable
and the statement bore “adequate indicia of reliability.”13 Crawford
overruled Roberts and placed the focus on whether a given statement
was “testimonial.”14
7. Chavis v. Delaware, 227 A.3d 1079, 1080–82 (Del. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 1528 (2021).
8. Id. at 1081.
9. Id. at 1095.
10. Chavis v. Delaware, 141 S. Ct. 1528, 1528 (2021) (denying certiorari and noting
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent).
11. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36 (2004).
12. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also Paul F. Rothstein & Ronald J.
Coleman, Confronting Memory Loss, 55 GA. L. REV. 95, 100 (2020) [hereinafter Confronting Memory Loss] (“Prior to Crawford, courts were guided in Confrontation
Clause cases by Ohio v. Roberts.”).
13. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Roberts,
“[r]eliability [could] be inferred without more in a case where the evidence [fell]
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” Id.
14. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; see also David L. Noll, Constitutional Evasion and
the Confrontation Puzzle, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1899, 1910 (2015) (“Crawford rejected the
Roberts framework root and branch.”); Confronting Memory Loss, supra note 12, at
100 (noting “Crawford and its progeny altered the paradigm”); Richard D. Friedman
et al., Crawford, Davis, & the Right of Confrontation: Where Do We Go From Here?,
19 REGENT U. L. REV. 507, 515–16 (2007) (Professor Richard D. Friedman stated, “I
don’t think Roberts was working.”).
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A. The “New” Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
In Crawford, Michael Crawford was tried for attempted murder and
assault, and the state attempted to use his wife’s tape-recorded statements as evidence against him.15 The wife had made the statements
during a police interrogation, but she did not testify at trial due to the
State of Washington’s marital privilege rules.16 Crawford argued that
admission of her recorded statements violated his Confrontation
Clause rights, but the wife’s recorded statements were nevertheless
admitted and played for the jury.17
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, determined that admission of
the recorded statements violated the Confrontation Clause.18 He considered the Sixth Amendment’s text, lengthy history of confrontation
rights, and prior Supreme Court precedent and advanced two conclusions regarding the Confrontation Clause: (1) The Clause only applied
to so-called “testimonial” statements, and (2) use of the “testimonial”
statements made by a declarant not appearing at trial was impermissible unless the declarant was “unavailable” and the defendant had
some prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.19
Justice Scalia reasoned that the primary evil at which the Clause
was directed was the civil law style of criminal procedure, and in particular its using ex parte examinations against the accused.20 Such
practices were exemplified by the “notorious” Sir Walter Raleigh treason trial, in which out-of-court evidence from Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, was used against Raleigh at trial, and the
judges refused Raleigh’s demand that Cobham appear.21 The Clause’s
text, itself, also applied to “witnesses,” meaning those who “bear testimony.”22 Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause applied only to what
Justice Scalia referred to as “testimonial” statements: a certain class of
out-of-court statements which are the functional equivalent of in15. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38–40.
16. Id. at 40.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 68–69.
19. Id. at 40–60.
20. Id. at 50.
21. Id. at 44. Said Justice Scalia:
Through a series of statutory and judicial reforms, English law developed a
right of confrontation that limited these abuses. For example, treason statutes required witnesses to confront the accused ‘face to face’ at his arraignment. Courts, meanwhile, developed relatively strict rules of unavailability,
admitting examinations only if the witness was demonstrably unable to testify in person. Several authorities also stated that a suspect’s confession
could be admitted only against himself, and not against others he implicated.
Id. at 44–45 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 51; cf. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Essay, Crawford v. Washington: The Next Ten
Years, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9, 10 (2014) (“The testimonial approach
starts from the premise that the Confrontation Clause is not a rule of evidence but
rather one of criminal procedure.”).
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court testimony.23 Justice Scalia left setting out a “comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial’ ” for “another day” but noted that whatever its
definition, it applied to police interrogations and prior testimony at a
former trial, before a grand jury, and at a preliminary hearing.24 On
the facts of the case, Justice Scalia found that admission of Crawford’s
wife’s statements without the opportunity for cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause.25
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion joined by Justice O’Connor,
decried the Court’s overruling of Roberts and “adoption of a new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause [that] is not backed by sufficiently persuasive reasoning to overrule long-established
precedent.”26 He believed that the new interpretation was unnecessary for deciding the case and that the Court had “cast[ ] a mantle of
uncertainty over future criminal trials.”27 The Chief Justice noted that
while the Court chose not to provide a comprehensive definition for
“testimonial,” state and federal prosecutors needed answers now—not
months or even years from now—on what the term covers aside from
the specific examples the Court had enumerated.28

23. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. The Court noted as follows:
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist: “ex
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” “extrajudicial statements . . .
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions,” “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial[.]” These formulations all
share a common nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at various
levels of abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise articulation, some
statements qualify under any definition—for example, ex parte testimony at
a preliminary hearing.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
24. Id. at 68; accord Natasha Crawford, Williams v. Illinois: Confronting Experts,
Science, and the Constitution, 64 MERCER L. REV. 805, 810 (2013). These, according to
Justice Scalia, were the “modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which
the Confrontation Clause was directed.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
25. Id. at 68–69.
26. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessing Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1353 (2006) (“In
Crawford v. Washington, the Court changed the law, overruled precedent, and provided more protections under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by
limiting hearsay testimony that could be used against criminal defendants.”).
27. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice
noted that in his view, “[t]he Court’s distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better rooted in history than our current
doctrine.” Id.
28. Id. at 75.
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After Crawford, the Court would attempt to devise an approach for
determining when a given statement would be testimonial.29 That approach came to focus on the statement’s objective primary purpose.
B. The Primary Purpose Test
The Court has come to rely on analyzing the objective primary purpose of a statement to determine whether such statement should be
considered testimonial. The Court developed this test in Davis v.
Washington30 and Michigan v. Bryant,31 and has since applied it in
cases like Ohio v. Clark.32
In Davis, the Court created an “emergency” exception to the class
of testimonial statements.33 Davis called upon the Court to rule on
two consolidated appeals: (1) State v. Davis,34 which concerned the
state seeking to admit statements made to a 911 operator before police arrived on the scene; and (2) Hammon v. State,35 which concerned
the state seeking to admit statements made by an alleged victim after
police arrived on the scene and the alleged perpetrator appeared
under control.36 Justice Scalia authored the Court’s opinion and stated
as follows:
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all
conceivable statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.37

Applying this standard, the Court found that the statements to the 911
operator in State v. Davis were nontestimonial since “the circum29. Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1865, 1867 (2012) (“As ambitious as the case was, Crawford only mapped out the
rough contours of the long-awaited Confrontation Clause revolution, leaving a number of important questions ‘for another day.’ ”).
30. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 813 (2006).
31. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 344 (2011).
32. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 237 (2015).
33. See generally Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
34. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 844 (Wash. 2005).
35. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 444 (Ind. 2005); see generally Frederick
Schauer, Constitutionalism and Coercion, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1881, 1890–91 (2013) (discussing Hammon).
36. Davis, 547 U.S. at 818–21.
37. Id. at 817, 822. For purposes of its decision, the Court considered the 911 operator in State v. Davis an agent of law enforcement. See id. at 823 n.2.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL103.txt

172

unknown

Seq: 8

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

8-NOV-21

14:24

[Vol. 9

stances of [the declarant’s] interrogation objectively indicate[d] its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency” and the declarant was not simply “a weaker substitute for
live testimony at trial.”38 In contrast, the statements in Hammon were
testimonial since “the circumstances [indicated] that the interrogation
was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct,” no
emergency was in progress, and the statements were “an obvious substitute for live testimony.”39
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, criticizing the Court’s adoption of the primary purpose test.40
In addition to the test being hard for the courts to apply, Justice
Thomas felt that it characterized as “testimonial,” and thus inadmissible, evidence that bore little resemblance to the type of evidence the
Court had previously determined was targeted by the Confrontation
Clause.41 Justice Thomas set out his formality and solemnity view,
pursuant to which “statements regulated by the Confrontation Clause
must include ‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions.’ ”42 He also previewed the so-called “mixed motives”
problem—which would be discussed further in Bryant—by stating as
follows:
In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of a
crime, whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or otherwise,
the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the perspective of the
police, are both to respond to the emergency situation and to gather
evidence. Assigning one of these two “largely unverifiable motives,”
primacy requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will rarely
be present—and is not reliably discernible. It will inevitably be,
quite simply, an exercise in fiction.43

In Bryant, the Court further developed its primary purpose approach and sought to address the mixed motives problem. Bryant con38. Id. at 828 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Inadi,
475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)). The Court noted that in cases like Sir Walter Raleigh’s and
others, “the ex parte actors and the evidentiary products of the ex parte communication aligned perfectly with their courtroom analogues. [The State v. Davis declarant’s]
emergency statement does not. No ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an emergency
and seek help.” Id.
39. Id. at 829–30 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. Id. at 834.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 836 (citation omitted). Justice Thomas would come to repeat this formality and solemnity view in future cases, but it has, so far, not gained much traction with
the other Justices. E.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 378–79 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
43. Id. at 839 (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original). As will be discussed further below, the mixed motives problem arises where, for instance, an interrogator has more than one motivation in asking questions and a declarant has more
than one motivation in answering such questions or otherwise making statements.
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 367–69 (2011).
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cerned attempted use of statements made by an alleged victim to
police who found the victim mortally wounded in the parking lot of a
gas station.44 The declarant-victim did not appear at trial, since he had
passed away, but the police officers who had spoken to the victim on
the scene testified as to what the victim had told them.45 Justice
Sotomayor, writing for the Court, built upon the Davis principles:
When, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an interrogation is to
respond to an “ongoing emergency,” its purpose is not to create a
record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause. But there may be other circumstances, aside from
ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules
of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be
relevant. Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of
a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not
the Confrontation Clause.46

The Court also noted that the situation in Bryant was different from
that in Davis and thus required further clarification of the emergency
exception from Davis:
We now face a new context: a nondomestic dispute, involving a victim found in a public location, suffering from a fatal gunshot wound,
and a perpetrator whose location was unknown at the time the police located the victim. Thus, we confront for the first time circumstances in which the “ongoing emergency” discussed in Davis
extends beyond an initial victim to a potential threat to the responding police and the public at large.47

In making the determination of whether the primary purpose of a
given interrogation would be to assist an ongoing emergency, the
Court said it would “objectively evaluate the circumstances in which
the encounter occurs and the statements and actions of the parties.”48
The Court recognized the mixed motives problem, pursuant to which
interrogators might have more than one motivation in asking questions and declarants might have more than one motive in making
statements.49 It stated that in many circumstances, the primary pur44. Id. at 348.
45. Id. at 348–50.
46. Id. at 358–59 (alterations in original).
47. Id. at 359.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 367–69. Said the Court:
Police officers in our society function as both first responders and criminal
investigators. Their dual responsibilities may mean that they act with different motives simultaneously or in quick succession. Victims are also likely to
have mixed motives when they make statements to the police. During an
ongoing emergency, a victim is most likely to want the threat to her and to
other potential victims to end, but that does not necessarily mean that the
victim wants or envisions prosecution of the assailant. A victim may want the
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pose would be best ascertained by looking at the contents of questions
and answers.50 By taking the combined approach, the Court reasoned,
problems arising from looking only to one participant—such as the
mixed motives problem—could be ameliorated.51 On the facts of Bryant, the Court determined that the emergency exception applied, and
the victim’s statements were nontestimonial.52
Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion, again relying on his
formality and solemnity view. He determined that the statements
lacked sufficient formality and so would not be testimonial.53
Justice Scalia dissented, charging the Court with having reached a
“patently incorrect conclusion on the facts” and having “distort[ed]
our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.”54 He noted that Crawford
and Davis had not addressed whose perspective was relevant for the
primary purpose test: the interrogator’s, the defendant’s, or both.55 He
attacker to be incapacitated temporarily or rehabilitated. Alternatively, a severely injured victim may have no purpose at all in answering questions
posed; the answers may be simply reflexive. The victim’s injuries could be so
debilitating as to prevent her from thinking sufficiently clearly to understand
whether her statements are for the purpose of addressing an ongoing emergency or for the purpose of future prosecution. Taking into account a victim’s injuries does not transform this objective inquiry into a subjective one.
The inquiry is still objective because it focuses on the understanding and
purpose of a reasonable victim in the circumstances of the actual victim—
circumstances that prominently include the victim’s physical state.
Id. at 368–69 (internal citation omitted).
50. Id. at 367–68. The Court provided an “extreme” example:
[I]f the police say to a victim, “Tell us who did this to you so that we can
arrest and prosecute them,” the victim’s response that “Rick did it” appears
purely accusatory because by virtue of the phrasing of the question, the victim necessarily has prosecution in mind when she answers.
Id. at 368.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 377–78. Justice Kagan did not take part in the consideration or decision
in Bryant. Id. at 378.
53. Id. at 378–79 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also again criticized the
Court’s primary purpose test. Id. at 379.
54. Id. at 379–80 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115, 132–37 (2012)
(discussing issues with the primary purpose test and arguing that Bryant “is a compelling illustration of the unworkability that is built into the Crawford rationale”); Richard D. Friedman & Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Frame of Reference and Other Problems,
113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 43, 45 (2014) (“We agree that it is confusing to
speak of an actor’s primary purpose ‘objectively considered.’ Purpose is a subjective
matter. But this aspect of the problem would disappear if the Court spoke, as we
believe it should, in terms of reasonable anticipation—rather than purpose—of
prosecutorial use.” (emphasis in original)). Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate dissenting opinion, which agreed with portions of Justice Scalia’s dissent. Bryant, 562 U.S. at
395 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She also emphasized that had the issue been properly
tendered in Bryant, she would have considered whether the dying declarations exception survived the Court’s recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Id.
55. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that in Crawford and
Davis, the statements were testimonial when viewed from any perspective, and he
believed the same was true in Bryant. Id.
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strongly disagreed with the Court’s combined approach and instead
believed it was the declarant’s intention which should count.56 Justice
Scalia proclaimed himself “at a loss to know how” the Court’s approach would ameliorate the mixed motives problem since adding the
mixed motives of police officers to the mixed motives of declarants
would only compound the problem.57 He also, among other things,
blasted the Court’s new “expansive exception to the Confrontation
Clause for violent crimes”58 and its “resurrected interest in
reliability.”59
56. Id. According to Justice Scalia:
For an out-of-court statement to qualify as testimonial, the declarant must
intend the statement to be a solemn declaration rather than an unconsidered
or offhand remark; and he must make the statement with the understanding
that it may be used to invoke the coercive machinery of the State against the
accused. That is what distinguishes a narrative told to a friend over dinner
from a statement to the police. The hidden purpose of an interrogator cannot substitute for the declarant’s intentional solemnity or his understanding
of how his words may be used.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
57. Id. at 383. In this regard, Justice Scalia noted as follows:
Now courts will have to sort through two sets of mixed motives to determine
the primary purpose of an interrogation. And the Court’s solution creates a
mixed-motive problem where (under the proper theory) it does not exist—
viz., where the police and the declarant each have one motive, but those
motives conflict. The Court does not provide an answer to this glaringly obvious problem, probably because it does not have one.
Id.; see also Crump, supra note 54, at 132–34 (“Because the state of mind of a declarant may include mixed motives, it is only by focusing on the primary purpose of the
statement that the court can achieve consistent results and . . . avoid appearing as a
collection of amateur mind-readers.”).
58. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 388, 392 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Noted Justice Scalia:
Because Bryant posed a continuing threat to public safety in the Court’s
imagination, the emergency persisted for confrontation purposes at least until the police learned his “motive for and location after the shooting.” It may
have persisted in this case until the police “secured the scene of the shooting” [two-and-a-half] hours later. (The relevance of securing the scene is unclear so long as the killer is still at large—especially if, as the Court
speculates, he may be a spree killer.) This is a dangerous definition of emergency. Many individuals who testify against a defendant at trial first offer
their accounts to police in the hours after a violent act. If the police can
plausibly claim that a “potential threat to . . . the public” persisted through
those first few hours, (and if the claim is plausible here it is always plausible)
a defendant will have no constitutionally protected right to exclude the uncross-examined testimony of such witnesses. His conviction could rest (as
perhaps it did here) solely on the officers’ recollection at trial of the witnesses’ accusations.
Id. at 388–89 (internal citations omitted).
59. Id. at 388–92. In terms of reliability, Justice Scalia argued,
Reliability tells us nothing about whether a statement is testimonial. Testimonial and nontestimonial statements alike come in varying degrees of reliability. An eyewitness’s statements to the police after a fender-bender, for
example, are both reliable and testimonial. Statements to the police from
one driver attempting to blame the other would be similarly testimonial but
rarely reliable.
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More recently, in Clark, the Court considered the primary purpose
approach in the child abuse context.60 Darius Clark had sent his girlfriend “away to engage in prostitution” and said he would care for her
children while she was gone.61 One day later, a teacher noticed,
among other things, red marks on the girlfriend’s three-year-old son,
and the son identified Clark as the abuser.62 The teacher alerted authorities through a child abuse hotline.63 At trial, the prosecution introduced the son’s statements to his teachers, and Clark was found
guilty on several counts of felonious assault.64 The question for the
Court was whether admission of the boy’s statements when he was
unavailable to be cross-examined violated the Confrontation Clause.65
Justice Alito, for the Court, determined that, since neither the
teachers nor the boy had the primary purpose of assisting in the prosecution of Clark, the boy’s statements did not violate the Confrontation
Clause and were admissible.66 Justice Alito noted that, because at
least certain statements to individuals other than law enforcement officers conceivably could raise Confrontation Clause concerns, the
Court would refrain from adoption of a categorical rule excluding
such statements from Confrontation Clause protection.67 However,
such statements, according to the Court, were “much less likely” to be
found testimonial.68 The Court considered the boy’s statements in
Clark nontestimonial since (1) they were made to his teachers, not law
enforcement; (2) they occurred in connection with an ongoing emergency of suspected child abuse; (3) there was no indication that the
conversation’s primary purpose was to gather evidence to prosecute
Clark; (4) “statements by very young children [ ] rarely, if ever, implicate[d] the Confrontation Clause”; and (5) there was “strong evidence” that statements made in similar circumstances to those in
Clark were admitted at common law.69 As to this last point, the Court
Id. at 392 (emphasis in original).
60. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 237 (2015). For a discussion of ambiguous-purpose statements of abuse victims before Clark, see generally Paul F. Rothstein, Ambiguous-Purpose Statements of Children and Other Victims of Abuse Under the
Confrontation Clause, 44 SW. L. REV. 508, 509–10 (2015).
61. Clark, 576 U.S. at 240. Clark was his girlfriend’s pimp. Id.
62. Id. at 241. The son had apparently referred to Clark by his nickname of “Dee”
in the identification. Id. Additional injuries were subsequently discovered. Id.
63. Id. at 241–42.
64. Id. at 242.
65. Id. at 240, 246–47. The son did not testify because the trial court found him
incompetent to testify. Id. at 241–42. Under Ohio law, “children younger than 10
years old are incompetent to testify if they ‘appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are examined, or of relating
them truly.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 240. The Court found Clark’s arguments to the contrary unavailing. Id.
at 247–50.
67. Id. at 246.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 246–48.
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noted that the primary purpose test was a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for Confrontation Clause exclusion since the Clause
did “not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court statements that
would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the
founding.”70
Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Ginsburg joined.71 He wrote separately to “protest the Court’s shoveling of
fresh dirt upon the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation so recently rescued from the grave in [Crawford].”72 He took issue with,
for instance, the Court’s characterization of Crawford and with the
suggestion that the primary purpose test was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition.73 Justice Scalia did emphasize his agreement with
the Court’s refusal to determine two questions unnecessary to the
Court’s holding:
what effect Ohio’s mandatory-reporting law has in transforming a
private party into a state actor for Confrontation Clause purposes,
and whether a more permissive Confrontation Clause test—one less
likely to hold the statements testimonial—should apply to interrogations by private actors.74

Still, Justice Scalia concluded that the statements in Clark would be
nontestimonial pursuant to the normal test for police interrogations.75
Justice Thomas also concurred and stated he would not have applied the primary purpose test in Clark.76 Instead, he would apply the
same test for statements to law enforcement agents as he applies to
private persons: “assessing whether those statements bear sufficient
indicia of solemnity to qualify as testimonial.”77 He concluded that the
son’s statements did not bear the requisite indicia of solemnity and
were nontestimonial.78
Even following Clark, a great deal of uncertainty remains in the
application of the primary purpose test.79 However, one of the most
70. Id. at 246, 249 (“Certainly, the statements in this case are nothing like the
notorious use of ex parte examination in Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason, which
we have frequently identified as ‘the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause
was directed.’ ” (citation omitted)).
71. Id. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 252.
73. Id. at 252–53 (noting “[t]he opinion asserts that future defendants, and future
Confrontation Clause majorities, must provide ‘evidence that the adoption of the
Confrontation Clause was understood to require the exclusion of evidence that was
regularly admitted in criminal cases at the time of the founding.’ ” (citation omitted)).
Justice Scalia noted that the Court got the burden backwards, and in fact the burden
is on the prosecution seeking to introduce the evidence. Id. at 253.
74. Id. at 251.
75. See id. at 252, 254.
76. Id. at 254 (Thomas, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 254–55 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 256.
79. For instance, questions persist, such as:
(1) What would make a purpose “primary” in a mixed motives situation?
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difficult issues the Supreme Court has had to face in the Confrontation Clause context is the challenge presented by forensic reports.
C. The Forensic Reports Challenge
The application of the Confrontation Clause to forensic reports has
proved particularly divisive in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court
considered this issue in a series of three cases: (1) Melendez–Diaz v.
Massachusetts;80 (2) Bullcoming v. New Mexico;81 and (3) Williams v.
Illinois.82 We refer to this series of cases as the “Melendez–Diaz
Trilogy.”
In Melendez–Diaz, Luis Melendez–Diaz had been convicted on
drug charges for selling cocaine.83 At trial, the state entered into evidence seized bags allegedly containing narcotics along with three “certificates of analysis”; these certificates reflected the results of forensic
analysis showing the substance in the bags contained cocaine, and they
had been sworn before a notary public pursuant to state law.84
Melendez–Diaz raised a Confrontation Clause objection, arguing that
Crawford required the forensic analysts to testify at trial, but his objection was overruled.85 After appeals, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case.86
Justice Scalia, for the Court, held that admitting the certificates was
a violation of the Confrontation Clause.87 For Justice Scalia, deciding
the case required “little more” than applying the Court’s holding in
Crawford.88 The Court determined that the certificates at issue were
“quite plainly affidavits” and had “little doubt” they fell “within the
(2) Whose purpose should be considered more significant—a declarant or a
questioner—if their purposes are materially different?
(3) What does it mean that the purpose should be determined “objectively”
from the standpoint of a “reasonable person” under the same
circumstances?
(4) Could volunteered statements without interrogation constitute a Confrontation Clause violation?
(5) And should a court break statements down into component parts so that
each part may be separately scrutinized under the primary purpose test?
Paul F. Rothstein, A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Decision in Ohio v. Clark,
CASETEXT (June 19, 2015), https://casetext.com/analysis/a-comment-on-the-supremecourts-decision-in-ohio-v-clark [https://perma.cc/3URQ-UVAE] [hereinafter Comment on Clark].
80. Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 305 (2009).
81. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 647 (2011).
82. Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 50 (2012) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in
original).
83. Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308–09.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 309.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 307, 309, 329.
88. Id. at 329; see also Crump, supra note 54, at 137–38 (“After Crawford, the
holding in Melendez–Diaz seemed unremarkable, even if its result was debatable.”).
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core class of testimonial statements” described in Crawford.89 The
Court also found that the analysts were “witnesses” for Confrontation
Clause purposes, and absent unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination, Melendez–Diaz had a right to confront them at
trial.90
Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion, again reiterating his
formality and solemnity view.91 In the instant case, he agreed with the
Court’s opinion that the certificates were affidavits and that they were
testimonial.92
Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito and Breyer in the dissent.93 Justice Kennedy charged the Court
with having “[swept] away” a long established rule under which scientific analysis could be admitted without the analyst who produced the
analysis testifying.94 Most concerning, according to Justice Kennedy,
was that the Court had made no attempt to acknowledge the differences between conventional witnesses and laboratory analysts performing scientific tests.95 The dissent considered “ordinary” or
conventional witnesses—such as those in Crawford and Davis—the
targets of the Confrontation Clause.96 It argued that the Court’s ruling
was “divorced from precedent, common sense, and the underlying
purpose of the [Confrontation] Clause” and had the “vast potential to
disrupt criminal procedures that already give ample protections
against the misuse of scientific evidence.”97
89. Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310–311 (quotation marks omitted). The Court
noted that the certificates were “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony,”
and not only were they created under circumstances leading an objective witness to
reasonably believe they would be available to be used at trial, but their sole purpose
under Massachusetts state law was to offer “prima facie evidence.” Id. The Court also
assumed the analysts would have been aware of the certificates’ evidentiary purpose
since it was reprinted on the certificates themselves. Id. at 311.
90. Id. at 311.
91. Id. at 329–30 (Thomas, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 330.
93. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 330–31. Justice Kennedy noted that the word “analyst” does not appear
in the Constitution, nor is there any accepted definition of it. Id. at 332; see also Andrew W. Eichner, The Failures of Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts and the Unstable
Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 437, 454 (2011) (“Not only does the [Court’s
Melendez–Diaz] opinion fail to answer the critical question of how to comprehensively define ‘testimonial,’ as left open by Crawford, but the holding also declares that
‘analysts’ who submit scientific affidavits for the purposes of a trial are witnesses giving testimonial statements under the Sixth Amendment without actually defining the
characterizing traits that dictate exactly who falls within that category.”). Justice
Scalia and the majority were unpersuaded that scientific analysts who create reports
should be treated differently than conventional witnesses for confrontation purposes.
See Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 315–24.
97. Id. at 331–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Importantly, the dissent also argued, among other things, that the
Court’s ruling did not make clear who among a string of analysts involved in a test would be required to testify.98 The dissenters offered
the example of a routine drug test involving four individuals: (1) an
individual who prepares the sample, puts it in a machine, and retrieves
the printout from the machine (often a graph); (2) an individual who
interprets the graph; (3) an individual who calibrates the machine and
certifies it is in working order; and (4) an individual such as a director
who certifies that any subordinates followed procedures.99 Requiring
even one such analyst to testify would “disrupt if not end many prosecutions,” and if all were required to testify, the Court had, “for all
practical purposes, forbidden the use of scientific tests in criminal
trials.”100
The majority opinion in the case responded to the dissent’s critique
regarding the involvement of multiple analysts:
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, we do not hold, and it is not
the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of
the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case. While the dissent is correct that “[i]t is the obligation of
the prosecution to establish the chain of custody,” this does not
mean that everyone who laid hands on the evidence must be called.
As stated in the dissent’s own quotation, “gaps in the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.” It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the
chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced
live. Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of
equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial
records.101

This question of which analyst must testify would be partially addressed in the second case in the Melendez–Diaz Trilogy: Bullcoming.
98. See id. at 332.
99. Id. at 332; see also Stephen Wills Murphy, The Confrontation Clause and the
Ongoing Fight to Limit Melendez-Diaz, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (2010), https://
harvardlpr.com/online-articles/the-confrontation-clause-and-the-ongoing-fight-tolimit-melendez-diaz/ [https://perma.cc/K6G5-MY4C] (“While Melendez–Diaz stated
that admission of a forensic report requires accompanying testimony by an analyst,
the Court did not specify which analyst, or analysts, would be required to testify—
although both the majority and the dissent noted the importance of this issue.”);
Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 5, at 535–38 (providing example of typical toxicology test involving up to five individuals).
100. Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Casey
Unwin, No Longer the Right to Remain Silent: Cross-Examining Forensic Analyst Testimony, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1025, 1042 (2010).
101. Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1 (emphasis added and internal citations
omitted). Justice Scalia also responded to the dissent’s dire predictions by arguing that
the Confrontation Clause could not be “disregard[ed] . . . at our convenience” and by
doubting those dire predictions. Id. at 325.
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In Bullcoming, Donald Bullcoming had been arrested for driving
while intoxicated, and the prosecution sought to use a lab report at
trial certifying that Bullcoming’s blood alcohol concentration
(“BAC”) exceeded the relevant threshold.102 The BAC analysis underlying the lab report utilized a gas chromatograph machine, and operation of the machine required specialized knowledge and training.103
At trial, rather than calling the analyst who signed the certification as
a witness, the prosecution instead offered testimony from a different
analyst.104 This testifying analyst had familiarity with testing procedures at the lab but did not observe or participate in the actual test on
Bullcoming’s sample.105 The New Mexico Supreme Court considered
the BAC analysis testimonial in light of Melendez–Diaz but determined that the testimony of the testifying analyst was sufficient for the
Confrontation Clause.106 First, the court reasoned that the analyst
who certified the report was a “mere scrivener” who had simply transcribed results from the machine.107 Second, the court found that the
qualified expert witness who testified could serve as a “surrogate” witness for the analyst who certified the report.108 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed the New Mexico Supreme
Court.109
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, determined that admission
of the report was a violation of the Confrontation Clause.110 It was
impermissible, said the Court, to admit a testimonial statement of one
individual (the certifying analyst) through the trial testimony of a separate individual (the testifying analyst).111 The certifying analyst was
more than a “mere scrivener” since he made several representations
regarding the sample not revealed by the machine-produced data.112
Moreover, the “surrogate” testimony of the testifying analyst was insufficient since it could not reveal what the certifying analyst observed
or knew about the actual test or testing process employed.113 Nor
could the surrogate testimony uncover any “lapses or lies” by the cer102. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 651 (2011).
103. Id. at 654. Several steps are also involved in the process, and human error may
occur at each of these steps. Id.
104. Id. at 651.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 651–56.
107. Id. at 657.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 657–58.
110. See id. at 650, 652. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion did not constitute the Court’s
opinion as to Part IV (concerning the burden on the prosecution) or footnote 6 (concerning the “primary purpose” analysis). Id. at 650, 659 n.6, 665–68.
111. Id. at 657–58. This is so absent unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination, of course. Id. at 657.
112. Id. at 659–60.
113. Id. at 661.
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tifying analyst.114 Finally, the Court considered the assertions in the
BAC report testimonial, notwithstanding that the report was
unsworn.115
The same four Justices who had dissented in Melendez–Diaz also
dissented in Bullcoming.116 Writing again for the dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that some of its principal objections to the Court’s underlying theory had been set out in its Melendez–Diaz dissent, so there
was no need to repeat them.117 The dissent also felt that—whether or
not one agreed with Melendez–Diaz—it was wrong to extend such
holding to cover the situation in Bullcoming.118 The dissent charged
that, before its Bullcoming opinion, the Court had never found that
the Confrontation Clause would bar admission of scientific findings
where an employee from the relevant lab authenticated the findings,
testified on the lab’s practices and methods, and was cross-examined
at trial.119
The dissent also took time to emphasize that the information in the
report resulted from a scientific process involving multiple participants’ acts, including (1) receiving the sample; (2) recording its receipt; (3) storing the sample; (4) placing it into the testing device; (5)
transposing the test results’ printout onto the report; and (6) reviewing the results.120 The record revealed, according to the dissent, that
the role of the certifying analyst in Bullcoming was “no greater than
that of anyone else in the chain of custody.”121 The dissent further
charged,
It is not even clear which witnesses’ testimony could render a scientific report admissible under the Court’s approach. Melendez–Diaz
stated an inflexible rule: Where “analysts’ affidavits” included “testimonial statements,” defendants were “entitled to be confronted
114. Id. at 661–62. The Court found it significant that the certifying analyst had
been put on unpaid leave, and the testifying analyst lacked knowledge of the reasons
for that. Id. at 662. The Court also emphasized that there was no assertion that the
testifying analyst held any “independent opinion” as to Bullcoming’s BAC. Id.
115. Id. at 664–65. In a portion of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion not constituting the
opinion of the Court, Justice Ginsburg also rejected arguments “that unbending application of the Confrontation Clause to forensic evidence would impose an undue burden on the prosecution.” Id. at 665.
116. Compare Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), with Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
117. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 674–75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (noting that “because [the testifying analyst in Bullcoming] was not the
analyst who filled out part of the form and transcribed onto it the test result from a
machine printout, the Court finds a confrontation violation”).
119. Id. at 675. The dissent also, among other things, criticized the Court for permitting certain principles—such as solemnity—to “weave[ ] in and out of the Crawford jurisprudence” and for fashioning an approach under which it was “not even
clear which witnesses’ testimony could render a scientific report admissible.” Id. at
678–79.
120. Id. at 676.
121. Id.
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with the analysts” themselves. Now, the Court reveals, this rule is
either less clear than it first appeared or too strict to be followed. A
report is admissible, today’s opinion states, if a “live witness competent to testify to the truth of the statements made in the report”
appears. Such witnesses include not just the certifying analyst, but
also any “scientist who . . . perform[ed] or observe[d] the test reported in the certification.”122

The dissent noted that the Court in Melendez–Diaz had insisted its
opinion did not “require everyone in the chain of custody to testify”
but had then “qualified that ‘what testimony is introduced must . . . be
introduced live.’ ”123 According to the dissent:
This could mean that a statement that evidence remained in lawenforcement custody is admissible if the statement’s maker appears
in court. If so, an intern at police headquarters could review the
evidence log, declare that chain of custody was retained, and so testify. The rule could also be that the intern’s statement—which draws
on statements in the evidence log—is inadmissible unless every officer who signed the log appears at trial. That rule, if applied to
[Bullcoming], would have conditioned admissibility of the report on
the testimony of three or more identified witnesses. In other instances, 7 or even 40 witnesses could be required. The court has
thus—in its fidelity to Melendez–Diaz—boxed itself into a choice of
evils: render the Confrontation Clause pro forma or construe it so
that its dictates are unworkable.124

Justice Sotomayor authored a concurrence in which she, among
other things, emphasized the limitations of the Court’s opinion.125
Specifically, Justice Sotomayor articulated four “factual circumstances” not presented in Bullcoming, which implied that she might
theoretically have come out differently had any such circumstances
been present.126 First, Bullcoming was not a case in which the prosecution had suggested an alternative purpose for the BAC report.127 Second, Bullcoming did not present the situation of a “supervisor,
reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection
to the scientific test” taking the stand.128 Third, Bullcoming was not a
case in which the expert witness was asked to provide her independent
opinion regarding underlying testimonial reports which were not,
122. Id. at 678–79 (internal citations omitted).
123. Id. at 679–80 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 680 (internal citations omitted); see also John Rafael Peña Perez, Confronting the Forensic Confirmation Bias, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 457, 466 (2015)
(“Melendez–Diaz and Bullcoming created line-drawing problems because anywhere
from six to twelve analysts could be involved with the procedures of a single forensic
test.”).
125. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 668 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
126. See id. at 668, 672–74.
127. Id. at 672. For instance, the prosecution had not argued the report was necessary for Bullcoming’s medical treatment. Id.
128. Id. at 672–73.
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themselves, admitted.129 Fourth, Bullcoming did not present a situation in which the prosecution sought to simply introduce machine-generated results, such as a gas chromatograph’s printout.130 Justice
Sotomayor also emphasized that the Court’s opinion did not mean
that everyone noted on the report needed to testify.131
In Williams—the final case in the Melendez–Diaz Trilogy—the
Court was asked to consider a case quite similar to Justice
Sotomayor’s third hypothetical in Bullcoming: “an expert witness . . .
asked for [an] independent opinion about [an] underlying testimonial
report[ ]” not itself admitted.132 The defendant, Sandy Williams, had
been convicted of rape after a bench trial.133 During the trial, the prosecution had called Sandra Lambatos, an expert, to testify that a DNA
profile, which was produced by Cellmark, an outside laboratory,
matched a DNA profile that the state’s police laboratory produced
using a sample of the defendant’s blood.134 The Cellmark report was
never admitted, nor was it shown to the factfinder.135 Lambatos did
not read from, or quote, the Cellmark report, and she never identified
it as the source of opinions she expressed.136 Lambatos also provided
an explanation of the notations on certain documents which were admitted as business records, testifying that, according to the records,
swabs from the victim had been sent to, and received from,
Cellmark.137 Lambatos did not make any other statement offered for
the purposes of identification of the sample used to derive the profile
or for purposes of establishing how Cellmark tested or used the sample.138 Nor had Lambatos vouched for the accuracy of Cellmark’s profile.139 On cross-examination, Lambatos did admit that she had not
conducted or observed the vaginal swab testing and that she relied on
the Cellmark DNA profile for her testimony.140
Williams contended that the expert’s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause.141 According to the Court’s plurality opinion, Williams’s main argument was that “the expert went astray when she
129. Id. at 673 (noting Federal Rule of Evidence 703 explained “that facts or data
of a type upon which experts in the field would reasonably rely in forming an opinion
need not be admissible in order for the expert’s opinion based on the facts and data to
be admitted”).
130. Id. at 673–74. For a more detailed discussion of the state of the law before and
after Bullcoming, see generally Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 5, at 518–24.
131. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 670 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing
Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009)).
132. Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 67 (2012) (plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 56, 64.
134. Id. at 56.
135. Id. at 62.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 56.
138. Id. at 56–57.
139. Id. at 57.
140. Id. at 62.
141. Id. at 57.
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referred to the DNA profile provided by Cellmark as having been
produced from semen found on the victim’s vaginal swabs.”142
Justice Alito wrote the plurality opinion, which the other
Melendez–Diaz dissenting Justices joined.143 The plurality found no
Confrontation Clause violation in Lambatos testifying for two independent reasons.144 First, out-of-court statements related by an expert
solely for purposes of explaining assumptions on which the expert’s
opinion rested were not offered for their truth.145 Justice Alito stated
as follows:
[T]he Cellmark report was not introduced into evidence. An expert
witness referred to the report not to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the report, i.e., that the report contained an accurate
profile of the perpetrator’s DNA, but only to establish that the report contained a DNA profile that matched the DNA profile deduced from petitioner’s blood. Thus, . . . the report was not to be
considered for its truth but only for the “distinctive and limited purpose” of seeing whether it matched something else. The relevance
of the match was then established by independent circumstantial evidence showing that the Cellmark report was based on a forensic
sample taken from the scene of the crime.146

Second, even if the Cellmark report had been admitted, there
would still be no Confrontation Clause violation since such report
“was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual.”147 According to the plurality, the Cellmark report’s primary
purpose “was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to
obtain evidence for use against petitioner, who was neither in custody
nor under suspicion at that time.”148 Indeed, the plurality noted that
those at Cellmark could not possibly have known the profile would
inculpate Williams or anyone else who had a DNA profile in the
database.149 Importantly, Justice Alito noted, among other things, that
since multiple technicians often work on each profile, “it [was] likely
that the sole purpose of each technician [was] simply to perform his or
her task in accordance with accepted procedures.”150
142. Id.
143. Compare id. at 55, with Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330
(2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
144. Williams, 567 U.S. at 57–58.
145. Id. at 58.
146. Id. at 79 (internal citation omitted).
147. Id. at 84.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 84–85. Justice Alito pointed out that the position of the Cellmark technicians was not unique and that laboratory technicians asked to work on DNA profiles
“often ha[d] no idea what the consequences of their work w[ould] be.” Id. at 85.
150. Id. He also mentioned that “the knowledge that defects in a DNA profile may
often be detected from the profile itself provides a further safeguard.” Id.
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Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion.151 Justice Thomas
wrote separately to again emphasize his formality and solemnity
view.152 He believed that the Cellmark statements had been offered
for their truth but that the report was insufficiently formal to be testimonial.153 Justice Thomas stated that he “share[d] the dissent’s view
of the plurality’s flawed analysis.”154
Justice Breyer also wrote separately to emphasize that he would
have permitted additional briefing on a question not sufficiently
treated by the plurality or the dissent: “How does the Confrontation
Clause apply to the panoply of crime laboratory reports and underlying technical statements written by (or otherwise made by) laboratory
technicians?”155 In that context, “what, if any, are the outer limits of
the ‘testimonial statements’ rule set forth in [Crawford]?”156 He noted
that under “well-established” evidentiary principles, an expert is entitled to rely on out-of-court inadmissible statements as a basis for the
forming of her expert opinion if such statements are of a kind experts
in the field would normally rely on, and the prosecution need not
enter such out-of-court statements for their truth.157 In speaking of
how the dissent would abandon this “well-established rule,” Justice
Breyer noted the following:
Once one abandons the traditional rule, there would seem often to
be no logical stopping place between requiring the prosecution to
call as a witness one of the laboratory experts who worked on the
matter and requiring the prosecution to call all of the laboratory
experts who did so. Experts—especially laboratory experts—regularly rely on the technical statements and results of other experts to
form their own opinions. The reality of the matter is that the introduction of a laboratory report involves layer upon layer of technical
statements (express or implied) made by one expert and relied upon
by another. Hence my general question: How does the Confrontation Clause apply to crime laboratory reports and underlying technical statements made by laboratory technicians?158
151. Id. at 102–03 (Thomas, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 103–04.
153. Id. at 103. Justice Thomas concluded as follows:
The Cellmark report lacks the solemnity of an affidavit or deposition, for it
is neither a sworn nor a certified declaration of fact. Nowhere does the report attest that its statements accurately reflect the DNA testing processes
used or the results obtained. The report is signed by two “reviewers,” but
they neither purport to have performed the DNA testing nor certify the accuracy of those who did. And, although the report was produced at the request of law enforcement, it was not the product of any sort of formalized
dialogue resembling custodial interrogation.
Id. at 111 (internal citations omitted).
154. Id. at 104 (Breyer, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 86.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 88.
158. Id. at 89.
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He appended an outline of “the way that a typical modern forensic
laboratory conducts DNA analysis” and discussed the following hypothetical example built upon an illustrative case raised by the dissent159:
[A]ssume that the admissibility of the initial laboratory report into
trial had been directly at issue. Who should the prosecution have
had to call to testify? Only the analyst who signed the report noting
the [DNA] match? What if the analyst who made the match knew
nothing about either the laboratory’s underlying procedures or the
specific tests run in the particular case? Should the prosecution then
have had to call all potentially involved laboratory technicians to
testify? Six to twelve or more technicians could have been involved.
Some or all of the words spoken or written by each technician out of
court might well have constituted relevant statements offered for
their truth and reasonably relied on by a supervisor or analyst writing the laboratory report. Indeed, petitioner’s amici argue that the
technicians at each stage of the process should be subject to crossexamination.160

Relatedly, Justice Breyer asked, “[t]o what extent might the ‘testimonial statements’ requirement embody one or more (or modified
versions) of the[ ] traditional hearsay exceptions”?161 He stated that
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges needed to know what the
Constitution required, and he noted that treatise writers and lower
courts offered a variety of solutions, some more “readily compatible
with Crawford than others.”162 In the absence of any additional brief159. Id. at 99–102 (internal citations omitted). According to Justice Breyer’s
appendix:
As many as six technicians may be involved in deriving the [DNA] profile
from the suspect’s sample; as many as six more technicians may be involved
in deriving the profile from the crime-scene sample; and an additional expert
may then be required for the comparative analysis, for a total of about a
dozen different laboratory experts. Each expert may make technical statements (express or implied) during the DNA analysis process that are in turn
relied upon by other experts. The amici dispute how many of these experts
the Confrontation Clause requires to be subject to cross-examination.
Id. at 100. The appendix provides a sample process for a profile of a suspect’s sample
and crime scene sample, each consisting of six steps: (1) evidence examination; (2)
extraction; (3) quantification; (4) amplification; (5) electrophoresis; and (6) report. Id.
at 100–102 (providing brief descriptions of each step). After the profile processes are
complete, an analyst makes a comparison of the two electropherograms and profiles
or reports, and “prepares her own report setting forth her conclusions about the DNA
match.” Id.
160. Id. at 90; see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Crime Lab in the Age of the Genetic
Panopticon, 115 MICH. L. REV. 979, 990 n.57 (2017) (citing Williams and referencing
“the various divisions of labor in modern crime labs between multiple technicians and
analysts”).
161. Williams, 567 U.S. at 91 (Breyer, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 91–92. Justice Breyer noted, for instance:
The New Wigmore . . . lists several nonexclusive approaches to when testifying experts may rely on testing results or reports by nontestifying experts
(i.e., DNA technicians or analysts), including: (1) “the dominant approach,”
which is simply to determine the need to testify by looking [at] “the quality
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ing, Justice Breyer sided with the dissenting views in Melendez–Diaz
and Bullcoming and joined the plurality opinion.163
Justice Kagan was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor in the dissent.164 Justice Kagan emphasized that prior
Court precedent had held that if the prosecution wished to introduce
results of forensic testing, it had to afford the defense an “opportunity
to cross-examine an analyst responsible for the test.”165 According to
the dissent, cross-examining the analyst was particularly likely to reveal whether vials had been switched, tests incompetently run, samples contaminated, or results recorded inaccurately.166 Under the
Court’s Confrontation Clause precedent, the dissent considered Williams “an open-and-shut case” in which Williams was not afforded his
confrontation rights.167 The dissent also attacked the Court for its inability to settle on a rationale for finding no Confrontation Clause
violation.168 Justice Kagan pointed out that five Justices had specifically rejected each aspect of the plurality’s reasoning and that the result was “five votes to approve the admission of the Cellmark report,
but not a single good explanation.”169
Williams represents the Supreme Court’s last major opinion on forensic reports and the Confrontation Clause. Following Williams—
of the nontestifying expert’s report, the testifying expert’s involvement in the
process, and the consequent ability of the testifying expert to use independent judgment and interpretive skill”; (2) permitting “a substitute expert to
testify about forensic science results only when the first expert is unavailable” (irrespective of the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the first expert); (3) permitting “a substitute expert” to testify if “the original test was
documented in a thorough way that permits the substitute expert to evaluate, assess, and interpret it”; (4) permitting a DNA analyst to introduce
DNA test results at trial without having “personally perform[ed] every specific aspect of each DNA test in question, provided the analyst was present
during the critical stages of the test, is familiar with the process and the laboratory protocol involved, reviews the results in proximity to the test, and
either initials or signs the final report outlining the results”; (5) permitting
the introduction of a crime laboratory DNA report without the testimony of
a technician where the “testing in its preliminary stages” only “requires the
technician simply to perform largely mechanical or ministerial tasks . . . absent some reason to believe there was error or falsification”; and (6) permitting introduction of the report without requiring the technicians to testify
where there is a showing of “genuine unavailability.”
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
163. Id. at 93.
164. Id. at 118 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 119.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 119–20.
168. Id. at 120.
169. Id. The dissent argued that “[t]he plurality’s first rationale endorses a
prosecutorial dodge; its second relies on distinguishing indistinguishable forensic reports.” Id. The dissent also noted that Justice Thomas’s approach suffered from “similar flaws.” Id. For further discussion of Williams, both before and after the Court’s
opinion, see Williams and the Confrontation Clause, supra note 5, and Unwrapping the
Box, supra note 5.
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which did not produce a usable majority and since which there has
been a change in the makeup170 of the Court—the current state of the
law in this area remains unclear.171 In particular, in cases involving
more than one forensic analyst, it has not been resolved which analyst

170. Since Williams was decided, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Ginsburg have been
replaced by Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, respectively, but it is still not
fully clear how the Court with these new Justices would rule on the forensic reports
issue. See, e.g., Confronting Memory Loss, supra note 12, at 144. However, Justice
Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Stuart may mean his views on the Confrontation
Clause are similar to those of Justice Scalia. See, e.g., id.; A Game of Katso and
Mouse, supra note 4, at 51; Richard D. Friedman, First word from Justice Gorsuch on
the Confrontation Clause, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2018/11/first-word-from-justice-gorsuch-on.html [https://
perma.cc/B27C-5HAZ] (“[I]t appears, from the first evidence [(Stuart)], that the passing of Justice Scalia’s seat to him will not do the doctrine any harm. . . . Ultimately, I
choose to look at the glass half full. Justice Gorsuch appears to be on the right side,
and we didn’t know that before. Perhaps Justice Kavanaugh is on the wrong side, but
[t]here’s no way of knowing for sure . . . .”); Laird Kirkpatrick, The Admissibility of
Forensic Reports in the Post–Justice Scalia Supreme Court, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE
(Aug. 27, 2019), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2019/08/27/the-admissibility-offorensic-reports-in-the-post-justice-scalia-supreme-court-by-laird-kirkpatrick/ [https://
perma.cc/5C8Z-V3LM] (stating it would appear Justice Gorsuch would side with the
dissent in Williams and support the result in Bullcoming and Melendez–Diaz just as
Justice Scalia had but noting it remained unclear what position Justice Kavanaugh
would take).
171. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; Edward K. Cheng & G. Alexander
Nunn, Beyond the Witness: Bringing a Process Perspective to Modern Evidence Law,
97 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1110 n.183 (2019) (“The Melendez-Diaz line of cases leaves
exactly who needs to be called somewhat murky.”); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports, Round Four, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 81
(2012) (“That the Williams Court was so splintered makes it difficult to determine
what the holding was.”); Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 100 (2012) (“In
the most recently decided case, Williams v. Illinois, the court issued a bewildering
array of opinions in which majority support for admitting the evidence at issue was
awkwardly knitted together out of several incompatible doctrinal bases.”); Lauren
McLane, Confronting the Twenty-First-Century Marian Examination, 82 ALB. L. REV.
949, 1002 (2019) (“Words like ‘muddled’ and ‘abyss’ have been used by the lower
courts to describe the state of the Supreme Court’s [C]onfrontation [C]lause doctrine
in the forensic evidence context.”); George Fisher, The Crawford Debacle, 113 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 17, 25 (2014) (“The result is a Court so badly splintered
that when it came time for Justice Alito to summarize Williams from the bench on the
day the Court ruled, he all but confessed his inability . . . .”); Ronald J. Allen, The
Hearsay Rule as a Rule of Admission Revisited, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1395, 1396
(2016) (noting “the Supreme Court has made a mess of confrontation jurisprudence”); Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence and Our Antiquated Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 657 (2014)
(referring to Williams as “a highly fractured opinion”); Jules Epstein, Continuing
Crawford/Confrontation “Confusion”, 34 AM. BAR ASS’N CRIM. JUST. MAG. 67, 68
(2019) (referring to the “ongoing national ‘confusion’ regarding Williams”); Marc D.
Ginsberg, The Confrontation Clause and Forensic Autopsy Reports—A “Testimonial”,
74 LA. L. REV. 117, 135 (2013) (“State supreme court justices have not been shy in
commenting on the uncertainty and ambiguity of Supreme Court opinions pertaining
to forensic documents and the Confrontation Clause.”).
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or analysts must testify.172 The Chavis petition currently pending
before the Supreme Court could permit further clarification in this
area.173
III. CHAVIS: THE RECENT MULTI-ANALYST PETITION
In Chavis v. Delaware, Dakai Chavis had been convicted of second
degree burglary of a ground-floor apartment.174 During the investigation, police had concluded that the burglar had entered through a bedroom window.175 The police had also obtained a DNA sample from
the apartment window and sent that sample to Bode Cellmark Forensics (“Bode Cellmark”), an out-of-state lab, for analysis.176 During a
search of Chavis’s residence, his mouth was swabbed for DNA, and
that sample was also sent to Bode Cellmark.177 At trial, Sarah Siddons, an analyst from Bode Cellmark, testified that the sample from
the bedroom window at the scene of the burglary (referred to as the
“crime scene” or “evidence” sample) matched the sample from Chavis
(referred to as the “reference” or “known person” sample).178
Several analysts from Bode Cellmark had handled both the “crime
scene” and “known person” samples and performed steps in the process on them.179 Siddons performed certain steps in the analysis process of both samples, but she did not witness or participate in all of
them.180 Siddons, among other things, confirmed that the two samples
matched and, since she was not involved in certain steps that other
analysts performed, “reviewed the case files for both [samples] . . . and
confirmed that Standard Operating Procedures were followed.”181
172. Arons, supra note 5, at 723–24; see generally supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text; see also Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 5, at 535–38.
173. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chavis v. Delaware, 141 S. Ct.
1528 (2021) No. 20-317, 2020 WL 5498422.
174. Chavis v. Delaware, 227 A.3d 1079, 1080–82 (Del. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 1528 (2021).
175. Id. at 1082.
176. Id. at 1081–82. Bode Cellmark is “a private laboratory in Lorton, Virginia that
specializes in forensic DNA testing.” Id. at 1082. In collecting the sample, “an evidence-detection specialist used a DNA collection kit supplied by Bode to process the
suspected point of entry (a window) at the crime scene, wiping the area of interest
with both wet and dry swabs.” Id. at 1083. The sample was placed in a sealed envelope
and, as far as the court knew, was delivered to the outside lab without incident. Id.
177. Id. at 1081–82. The detective obtained Chavis’s DNA sample “using a collection method known as buccal swabbing, by scraping the inside of Chavis’s cheeks with
a Q-tip-like swab to collect skin cells.” Id. at 1083. The sample was placed in a sealed
envelope and, as far as the court knew, was delivered to the outside lab without incident. Id. It should be noted that the “manner in which the investigating officers collected the crime-scene DNA sample and Chavis’s reference sample and delivered
those samples to Bode [Cellmark] [wa]s not at issue here.” Id.
178. Id. at 1081–86.
179. Id. at 1081.
180. Id. at 1081–86 (describing process in respect of each sample and noting relevant analysts).
181. Id. at 1086 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Satisfied that the other analysts had performed earlier steps in accordance with Bode Cellmark’s standard operating procedures, and did
so competently, Siddons authored a report, which contained the expert opinion she offered at trial.182
Before trial, the state had moved in limine to allow introduction of
Bode Cellmark’s DNA-testing analysis through the testimony of only
Siddons and without the need to produce other Bode Cellmark analysts.183 The state also argued that, under Delaware Rule of Evidence
703,184 and as an expert, Siddons could “rely on facts and data provided by the other analysts in rendering her opinion.”185 Chavis countered that, among other things, Siddons’s assurances that the other
analysts performed their analyses competently was insufficient to
meet the Confrontation Clause.186 Notwithstanding Chavis’s opposition, the court determined that the only “testimonial statements” in
Bode Cellmark’s DNA-analysis results were those by Siddons.187 As
such, Siddons was the only witness who testified in support of the results and conclusions of Bode Cellmark’s DNA testing at trial.188
At trial, Siddons testified in detail regarding the testing steps taken
by non-testifying analysts but did not recount any conclusions
reached, or statements made, by any such analysts.189 Siddons did explain as follows:
[S]he was able to generate one DNA profile from the two evidence
samples and a profile from the reference sample. And according to
[her], “the male profile obtained from the evidence sample was a
match to the male profile from [Chavis’s] reference sample,” matching at all fifteen loci. Siddons’s written report, which was admitted
into evidence, noted that “[t]he probability of randomly selecting an
unrelated individual with this DNA profile at 15 of 15 loci tested is
approximately . . . 1 in 26 quintillion in the U.S. African American
population.”190

On appeal, Chavis argued, among other things, that the DNA evidence’s introduction violated his rights under the Confrontation
Clause because the prosecution failed to present all analysts who had
conducted the DNA analysis.191 The Supreme Court of Delaware
noted that the parties disagreed as to whether the entries the nontestifying analysts made in the case files regarding their work—upon
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. This state rule is very similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 703. Compare DEL.
R. EVID. 703, with FED. R. EVID. 703.
185. Chavis, 227 A.3d at 1086.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1087.
188. Id. Chavis had no objection to Siddons’s status as an expert at trial. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. (internal citations omitted).
191. Id. at 1081.
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which Siddons relied in generating her report and offering her testimony—were testimonial.192 Chavis argued that Siddons made explicit
and implicit testimonial statements that Siddons relied upon and relayed to the jury.193 The state countered that the non-testifying analysts’ work was not testimonial for several reasons, including (1)
“many of the ‘processes for generating DNA profiles [were] automated’ ”; (2) “the DNA profiles [were] self-verifying because the
DNA profiles themselves would have reflected any errors” that were
“committed during the DNA testing’s preliminary stages”; (3) the implicit statements by the non-testifying analysts, upon which Siddons
relied in her testimonial affidavit, “were insufficiently formal to themselves qualify as testimonial statements”; and (4) Siddons was entitled
to rely upon the entries of the non-testifying analysts in the case files
because such entries were “facts or data . . . of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,” and they thus “need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”194
After considering U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as well as precedent from lower courts, the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded
that the entries in the case files from the non-testifying analysts were
not testimonial since such entries “did not take the form of statements” that were “designed to serve as a substitute for in-court testimony against Chavis.”195 As such, there was no Confrontation Clause
violation.196 In connection with the U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
the Delaware Supreme Court noted that none of the Melendez–Diaz
Trilogy was on point in resolving the present case.197 The court stated,
among other things:
Here, an expert, Siddons, testified to the results of a forensic analysis, but in doing so, relied upon information that experts in her field
typically rely upon—case files by other testing analysts who manipulate the DNA samples in order to prepare them for the expert, but
who do not themselves analyze the result. Because these other analysts are not testifying as to the final result of the forensic analysis, it
is not clear whether their work is testimonial under Melendez-Diaz,
which dealt with certificates attesting to the results of the forensic
testing. Nor is Siddons a surrogate expert as in Bullcoming—she
was herself involved in the preparation and analysis of the two
DNA samples. And there is no testimony as to a hypothetical here

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1088.
(certain internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations incorporated).
at 1082.
at 1090–91.
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[as in Williams]—Siddons worked on both DNA samples and testified as to the results of both.198

However, the court found that Bullcoming and Melendez–Diaz
pointed to an “indicator” as to when a statement will be testimonial:
“the purpose of the statement in proving an essential element of the
crime.”199
The Delaware Supreme Court found its conclusion consistent with
its own precedent and precedent from other states.200 For instance, the
court “tend[ed] to agree” with other states that have reached the conclusion “that analysts who only manipulate the DNA sample and who
state that they have followed standard operating procedures in doing
so are not making testimonial statements.”201
The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion continued that, in Chavis,
it could not be said that the manipulation of the samples by the nontestifying analysts, or their case file entries, were testimonial.202 That
the “primary purpose” of their entries was not to substitute for trial
testimony or provide evidence “against” Chavis was demonstrated by
the fact that they were not offered as trial evidence.203 The court emphasized that, based on the available record, the court could not be
sure what the statements even were.204 It could infer such statements
concerned whether the non-testifying analysts followed standard operating procedures, but such statements (i.e., that the analysts “examined and manipulated the DNA swabs in a particular manner”)
would not provide testimony “against” Chavis, as is required by the
Confrontation Clause.205
Nor, according to the court, would the relevant entries have been
offered in order to “show that Chavis committed an act that was an
element of the crimes with which [he] was charged.”206 Although the
DNA profile—which was the “end result” of the combined work of all
198. Id. (emphasis in original). The court noted that Siddons performed the quantification, amplification, and electrophoresis steps in connection with the “crime scene”
and “known person” samples, in addition to confirming the match. Id. at 1085–86.
199. Id. at 1091 (emphasis added). The court noted as follows:
Regrettably, the case files produced by the nontestifying analysts, which Siddons relied upon and which Chavis seems to claim contain the nontestifying
analysts’ out-of-court-statements, are absent from the record. But assuming
that we could conjure up those statements despite their absence, we could
not go so far as to presume that they include assertions of fact tending to
prove an essential element of the crimes.
Id. (citation omitted). The court found Chavis “falls somewhere between” Williams
and Bullcoming; and, unlike in those cases, the testifying analyst in Chavis was “involved in the testing of both DNA samples and . . . certified the results.” Id. at 1092.
200. Id. at 1091–94.
201. Id. at 1093.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. (emphasis in original).
206. Id.
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the analysts—was offered to prove the burglar’s identity, “the intermediary steps taken do not themselves prove—or aim to prove—anything.”207 Unable to identify any testimonial statements by the nontestifying analysts, the court determined that Chavis’s Confrontation
Clause claim must fail.208
The court stated that this did not mean that the non-testifying analysts’ statements were irrelevant to the opinion Siddons offered.209 To
the contrary:
Siddons acknowledged that the other analysts’ adherence to standard operating procedures and their entries in the case files to that
effect were essential to her conclusion. But just because a declarant
makes an out-of-court statement that may have some relevance to a
fact at issue in a criminal trial does not make that declarant a “witness against” the defendant within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment.210

On September 4, 2020, Chavis filed a certiorari petition for U.S.
Supreme Court review.211 The Chavis petition, among other things,
purported to ask the same question Justice Breyer raised in Williams:
“Which analysts must the prosecution call to testify when more than
one analyst was involved in testing” the forensic evidence introduced
at trial against the defendant?212 It argued that, while an answer to the
question presented has never been clear, Williams made the answer
less clear and “cast doubt on the precedent” for state and federal
courts.213 Chavis argued that, unlike in Williams, the DNA report and
testimony in Chavis were entered for their truth and that there was
“no issue” of the report’s accusatory nature.214 According to Chavis,
when the Delaware Supreme Court found no testimonial statements
by the non-testifying analysts, it had ignored that Siddons’s report and
testimony contained three testimonial statements—two of which were
hearsay—on which she relied and which had been introduced to establish the element of identification215:
In her lab report, Siddons asserts that the reference sample from
which the one profile was generated came from the buccal swab of
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1093–94 (alteration incorporated) (noting “Chavis might have challenged Siddons’s opinion or testimony on the grounds that they lacked an adequate
foundation because of her lack of personal involvement in the early stages of the
testing process or that Siddons’s reliance on information by the nontestifying analysts
was improper under [Delaware Rule of Evidence] 703[,] . . . [b]ut Chavis chose not to
challenge Siddons’s report or testimony on these evidentiary grounds”).
211. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chavis v. Delaware, 141 S. Ct. 1528 (2021) (No.
20-317), 2020 WL 5498422.
212. Id. at 15.
213. Id. at 15–16.
214. Id. at 24.
215. Id.
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Chavis. She also asserts that the evidentiary sample from which the
other profile was generated came from the crime scene window. Finally, she asserts that the two profiles matched. [And] [s]he testified
similarly.216

Chavis argued that by the time Siddons retrieved the tubes which contained extracted DNA, she was accessing evidence that she could not
identify as being provided by law enforcement.217 Without the nontestifying analysts’ representation, Siddons would not know the “identity” of the samples she used to generate profiles that she compared in
the case.218 Siddons, therefore, incorporated the testimonial statements of the non-testifying analysts as to the samples’ identification,
but she then testified to the profiles’ identification as a fact, certifying
their truth in her report.219 Accordingly, Chavis asserted that a
“straightforward application” of Bullcoming required the Delaware
Supreme Court to conclude that each analyst responsible for a testimonial statement in the report should have been produced.220
On March 8, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.221 Justice Gorsuch dissented from the denial of certiorari, noting he “dissent[ed] for the reasons set out in [his opinion dissenting from denial
of certiorari in] Stuart v. Alabama.”222 In his opinion dissenting from
denial of certiorari in Stuart, which was joined by Justice Sotomayor,
Justice Gorsuch had referred to the “various opinions [in Williams as]
hav[ing] sown confusion in courts across the country” and called for
greater “clarity” in the law.223
IV. ADDRESSING

THE

MULTI-ANALYST PROBLEM

Cases such as Chavis and Justice Breyer’s statements in Williams
make clear that, notwithstanding the Melendez–Diaz Trilogy, the
multi-analyst problem has not yet been resolved. In this Part, we will
216. Id. at 24–25 (internal citations omitted).
217. Id. at 25.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 26. The petition argued as follows:
[B]ecause of the confusion created by Williams, the court’s focus veered toward Siddons’ independent judgement and participation in the process
rather than on the testimonial nature of the hearsay statements contained in
her report and testimony that was introduced into evidence, who made those
statements and whether Chavis was able to confront those individuals.
Id. Chavis also argued that resolving the issue presented in Chavis was important to
the administration of justice and that Chavis was a good vehicle to resolve it. Id. at
26–29 (asserting that “[o]ne analyst’s assurances at trial regarding the actions of the
other analysts is insufficient to satisfy a defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine those analysts”).
221. Chavis v. Delaware, 141 S. Ct. 1528, 1528 (2021) (denying certiorari).
222. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
223. Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36–37 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see
also A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4, at 28.
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set out six plausible approaches that the Court might consider in addressing this problem.
We note at the outset that our analysis here rests upon several important assumptions. First, we assume, unless and until the Court
states otherwise, that Crawford and the Melendez–Diaz Trilogy remain binding precedent.224 Second, and flowing from our first assumption, we assume that where testimonial statements are contained in a
forensic report and that report is entered into evidence at trial, the
accused will generally have the right to confront at least one forensic
analyst. Third, we assume that the Court will find that not all analysts
in a multi-analyst forensic process need to appear.225 Indeed, we believe that the Supreme Court—at least as constituted before Justices
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined the Court—has been searching for a means of mitigating the impact of Crawford in forensic report cases and would prefer to limit the number of analysts who must
testify.226 Fourth, and finally, we assume that the Court would gener224. For instance, the Court could always decide to overrule Crawford, but that is
beyond the scope of our discussion here. See Confronting Memory Loss, supra note
12, at 124 n.189 (noting the possibility of overruling Crawford); Crump, supra note 54,
at 115, 150 (discussing “overruling of Crawford”).
225. It would be highly difficult logistically to produce each and every analyst, and
the Court’s opinion in Melendez–Diaz emphasized that not all analysts need to testify.
See Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009). Even the late Justice Scalia, one of the great proponents of the right to confront, has noted in a different confrontation context that the “Confrontation Clause guarantees only an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” United States v.
Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although Owens pre-dates Crawford, we will assume Owens continues to have relevance. See Confronting Memory Loss, supra note 12, at 120.
226. See Unwrapping the Box, supra note 5, at 512–13; Crump, supra note 54, at 150
(“The Court’s most recent confrontation decision [in Williams] shows, in operation,
the coalition that can overrule Crawford—and arguably, this decision does, in fact,
overrule it.”). The Melendez–Diaz dissenters (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito) constituted the plurality in Williams, suggesting that but for
precedent, those four Justices may not even have believed a single analyst must testify
in order to admit forensic reports consistent with the Confrontation Clause. See Unwrapping the Box, supra note 5, at 512–13; Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330; Williams
v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 55 (2012) (plurality opinion). If the plurality had not been able
to use its two theories for why the Confrontation Clause did not bar admission of the
evidence—i.e., the “not-targeted-person” and “not-for-truth” theories—they might
have suggested another theory, such as one based on reliability. See Unwrapping the
Box, supra note 5, at 512–13 (noting reliability is also mentioned in Bryant). Indeed,
the dissent in Williams suggested that the plurality “desire[d] to limit Melendez–Diaz
and Bullcoming in whatever way possible.” Williams, 567 U.S. at 141 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Arons, supra note 5, at 736. Evidence of the Court’s desire to reduce
the impact of Crawford may also be drawn from the more recent case of Clark. Although not a forensic reports case, Clark’s majority opinion advances the relatively
novel theory that the primary purpose test is not wholly determinative, noting for
instance, that the Confrontation Clause does not bar statements which would have
been admissible at the founding. Comment on Clark, supra note 78; Ohio v. Clark, 576
U.S. 237, 246 (2015) (“We have recognized that the Confrontation Clause does not
prohibit the introduction of out-of-court statements that would have been admissible
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ally favor a bright-line-type approach—which is easier for lower
courts to apply—rather than some type of multi-factor balancing
test.227
A. Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach
One approach that the Court could adopt would be to find that express or implied statements by interim analysts in a forensic process
chain are nontestimonial. We refer to this as the “Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach.”
Under this approach, for instance, the analyst asserting a match between the DNA of the accused and the DNA that was found at the
crime scene would normally need to testify. Similarly, the initial analyst or analysts in the chain—who, for instance, can more easily testify
as to the source of the samples—would need to testify. In contrast,
interim analysts merely making oral or written statements to a subsequent analyst in the forensic process chain would normally not be required to testify.
The rationale for not requiring interim analyst testimony would be
that statements to a subsequent analyst in the chain—perhaps concerning what a given analyst has found or done when passing on a
sample to the next analyst—would be considered nontestimonial. This
approach would presume that these interim statements would normally not be made for the primary purpose of use as evidence at trial
and instead would primarily be used for other purposes, such as producing a quality and accurate reading, reflecting what has been done
or not done, providing helpful background information, ensuring
chain of custody, or noting whether certain lab procedures have been
in a criminal case at the time of the founding.”). This theory greatly expands upon the
potential dying declaration exception mentioned in a footnote in Crawford, and it
might constitute a partial “escape hatch” from the primary purpose test in future
cases. Comment on Clark, supra note 79; see Clark, 576 U.S. at 246. In Crawford, the
Court stated as follows:
This is not to deny . . . that “[t]here were always exceptions to the general
rule of exclusion” of hearsay evidence. Several had become well established
by 1791. But there is scant evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit
testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
in original). However, in footnote 6, the Crawford Court recognized an exception for
dying declarations. Id. at 56 n.6 (“The one deviation we have found involves dying
declarations. The existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay law
cannot be disputed. Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there
is authority for admitting even those that clearly are. We need not decide in this case
whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.”
(internal citations omitted)).
227. See Confronting Memory Loss, supra note 12, at 121 n.181 (expressing belief
that “the Court would prefer a bright-line approach [as to a different Confrontation
Clause issue] due to [the Court’s] criticism of the subjectivity of the Roberts reliability
approach” and due to criticism of the “primary purpose” test’s subjectivity).
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followed. In some circumstances, an interim analyst may not even be
aware of why a test is being done. For instance, in a given DNA test,
the analysts working on the samples may not know if their work will
be used for a murder investigation, paternity test, or to match remains
in a mass grave from wartime. In other circumstances, interim analysts
may be aware that their statements—or the forensic process of which
they are a part—will be used as evidence or in an investigation. However, the individual oral or written statements of such interim analysts
would likely still not be for a primarily testimonial purpose.228 It could
also be found that statements of at least certain interim analysts are
insufficiently formal to invoke the protections of the Confrontation
Clause.229
The Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach could be
adapted to fit different definitions of testimonial that the Court may
ultimately prefer, particularly: (1) the standard definition: having the
“primary purpose” of establishing or proving “past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution”;230 and (2) Justice Alito’s enhanced definition in Williams, which seemingly required the statement
to be specifically accusatory of the accused;231 and (3) the definition of
the Delaware Supreme Court in Chavis: “the purpose of the statement
in proving an essential element of the crime.”232 Indeed, the court in
228. Subsequent analysts in the forensic chain may assume the work of a prior analyst was accurate, but such subsequent analysts would not actually be asserting this.
Such an approach may be seen as consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 703 and
related state analogues as well as with Williams. In fact, the situation under the Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach may be seen as easier for the
Court than the situation in Williams in certain instances since under the Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach, the interim statements themselves would
generally be nontestimonial.
229. See supra Part II (discussing formality and solemnity view of Justice Thomas).
230. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 375 (2011) (quoting Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
231. See A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4, at 53; Williams v. Illinois, 567
U.S. 50, 58 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“The report was produced before any suspect
was identified. The report was sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be
used against petitioner, who was not even under suspicion at the time, but for the
purpose of finding a rapist who was on the loose. And the profile that Cellmark provided was not inherently inculpatory.”). Justice Alito’s approach would, in certain
cases—such as when no perpetrator has been identified—require less analysts to testify. Indeed, in a case where no suspect is identified or even contemplated, perhaps
the Court would simply find that no analyst need testify. See A Game of Katso and
Mouse, supra note 4, at 53 (discussing Williams’s plurality opinion).
232. Chavis v. Delaware, 227 A.3d 1079, 1091–92 (Del. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 1528 (2021). In a separate part of the opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court alluded to a seemingly slightly different formulation, when it found that the non-testifying analysts were not testifying to the “final result” of the analysis, meaning it was
unclear that their work was testimonial under Melendez–Diaz, a case the court noted
concerned certificates which attested to the “result” of forensic analysis. Id. We will
assume that this “final result” formulation was intended to be consistent with—rather
than distinct from—the Delaware Supreme Court’s “essential element” formulation.
Even if the “final result” formulation were distinct, a version of the Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach could be fashioned to fit it. Under an Interim
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Chavis seemingly suggested that statements by analysts relating to adherence to protocols or standard procedures—or to the absence of
any irregularities—may be nontestimonial.233
Under the Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach, it
would be necessary to identify who is an interim witness not requiring
production. We do not believe the Court would find it practical to
require proof—perhaps by affidavit—of what each analyst’s primary
purpose was in a given case.234 Instead, we assume the Court would
adopt a more structured approach for lower courts to utilize. For instance, under an approach using the standard definition of “testimonial,” the Court could set a presumption that the final analyst in the
chain—e.g., the ultimate analyst who asserts a match between the alleged killer’s DNA and the DNA from the crime scene—and the first
person in the chain—e.g., the analyst responsible for checking the integrity of the packaging and origin of the sample(s)—would need to
testify. The Court could then set a presumption that the statements of
all other analysts—i.e., the interim analysts—would normally be nontestimonial. Finally, the Court could determine that, if the defense is
able to show any statement from an interim analyst had a primary
testimonial purpose, such interim analyst would then need to be
produced.235
Communications Not Testimonial Approach adapted to either Chavis formulation, we
anticipate less analysts would need to testify in certain cases than would need to
under an approach fitted to the standard definition for testimoniality. We also note
that either Chavis formulation goes too far in narrowing the confrontation right in
non-forensics cases. For example, imagine police were investigating a murder case
allegedly stemming from the defendant’s obsession with the victim. Suppose the prosecution sought to use a declarant’s statement made to police that the declarant saw
the defendant’s car in the parking lot of the victim’s office several times. This statement would be used as a circumstantial step in the murder case—i.e., it would not be
stating a “final result” or an “essential element”—and so this circumstantial link in
the chain of evidence could be excluded from coverage.
233. Id. at 1091 (“Even Chavis only posits that the non-testifying analysts’ statements relate to their adherence to testing protocols and the absence of irregularities
(following standard operating procedures and not seeing any evidence of taint or contamination)—he does not argue that those statements in and of themselves were used
to prove his identity or any other element of the crimes he was charged with.”). Thus,
the court noted, statements of analysts that they examined or manipulated DNA
swabs in a certain manner would not be considered to have provided testimony
“against” the defendant, as required by the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1093. Under
a Chavis approach, while a DNA profile may help prove the identity of an alleged
criminal, intermediary steps in the process do not prove—or seek to prove—anything.
Id.
234. The primary purpose test is also an objective test, meaning the motivation of
the speaker, listener, and/or solicitor of the statement may be relevant. Moreover, the
problem of “mixed motives” may impose further difficulties in determining a statement’s primary purpose. See supra Part II.
235. In this connection, the Court could allow the defense discovery of all the interim papers so that the defense could investigate whether anyone in the chain had a
primarily testimonial purpose.
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B. Hypothetical Assumption Approach
A second approach the Court could take would be to build upon
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion in Williams and find that a testifying
expert is merely basing her opinion on the hypothetical assumption
that statements of the non-testifying analysts are truthful. We refer to
this as the “Hypothetical Assumption Approach.”
Under this approach the Court would find that a testifying analyst is
not making any type of assertion that the statements of any other analysts are true. This way—consistent with Williams and Federal Rule of
Evidence 703—there would be no need for the prosecution to produce any of those other analysts. This approach would be best handled
through use of a hypothetical question to the testifying expert.236
Consistent with this approach, the prosecution would still need to
independently prove that the testifying expert’s assumption is true in
order for the fact finder to accept the expert’s opinion at trial. For
instance, to take an example based on Chavis, a testifying expert who
handled a match between two DNA profiles might be assuming that
one sample came from the crime scene and the other from the accused. It would fall to the prosecution to actually prove the source of
these samples. Similarly, an expert testifying about a report finding a
certain substance on accused’s person was methamphetamine may be
assuming that the sample of the substance came from the accused. The
prosecution would still need to prove that such assumption was
correct.
As a matter of evidence, however, the only way for the prosecution
to prove such non-testifying analysts’ statements are true may be calling each relevant analyst to testify. This would mean that, as a practical matter, in many cases the Hypothetical Assumption Approach
may not appreciably reduce the number of analysts who actually must
testify at trial. If it so chose, the Court could seek to help mitigate this
by recognizing a routine practice-type argument—pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 406—to the effect that forensic reports out of a specific lab have always produced accurate results.237 More specifically,
for instance, if a testifying analyst assumed that an interim analyst had
followed lab procedures in calibrating an apparatus, it might be possible to introduce evidence—perhaps through testimony and relevant
business records—showing that such procedure was always or habitually followed by the lab or analyst in calibrating the apparatus.238
236. See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 57 (2012) (plurality opinion).
237. See FED. R. EVID. 406 (“Evidence of a person’s habit or an organization’s
routine practice may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or
organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine practice. The court may
admit this evidence regardless of whether it is corroborated or whether there was an
eyewitness.”)
238. In addition, Justice Alito, in Williams, suggested that circumstantial evidence—the fact that a sample was sent to the lab in the circumstances in Williams and
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C. More Than Surrogate Approach
A third approach could be for the Court to permit a single analyst—
who is more than the “surrogate” witness discussed in Bullcoming—to
testify. We refer to this as the “More Than Surrogate Approach.”
We have previously argued that it may already be sufficient to offer
the testimony of a single forensic analyst so long as such analyst is
considerably more than a “surrogate” witness and certainly not a
mere “conduit” for admission of un-confronted hearsay.239 In determining whether a given analyst would meet the Confrontation Clause
under this approach, we believe at least three factors may be relevant.
First, it may be relevant how prominently the report was used at trial,
that is, whether it was introduced or extensively mentioned.240 Second, it may be relevant to consider the degree to which the testifying
expert is exercising her own judgment in constructing her opinion, including the thoroughness of her review of the statements of other analysts and her involvement in the specific process at issue, laboratory
conducting the process, and other processes of like kind.241 Third, it
may be relevant the degree to which the testifying analyst permits the
accused to fully cross-examine the entire forensic analysis.242
The ideal testing analyst under the More Than Surrogate Approach
might be extremely closely connected to the testing process and the
lab at issue, be able to testify to extensive steps of internal validation
and an intensive review and analysis of the other analysts’ work, and
be capable of affording the accused a sufficient opportunity to crossexamine her regarding all the steps in the forensic process.243 The analyst should also offer an independent opinion based at least in part on
her own analysis and not simply act as a conduit for admitting hearsay.244 Although qualifying as a testifying analyst under this approach
may be difficult, if the Court were to set clear criteria on who would
be a sufficient testifying analyst, labs could adjust accordingly. Once
labs understood the criteria, they could begin to designate at the outset of a process who would be the testifying analyst—should one be
needed—and ensure that such person meets relevant criteria. Clear
criteria would also allow other local stakeholders to better prepare for
trial.
was later returned, and the fact that the lab’s test results squared with the victim’s
identification of the culprit—apparently could solve the requirement of independent
proof for both the source problem (i.e., where the sample came from) and the internal
validity problem (i.e., the following of protocols). See Williams, 567 U.S. at 74–77.
239. See A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4, at 54–55 (discussing approach
in United States v. Katso, 74 M.J. 273, 273 (C.A.A.F. 2015)).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. It is unclear that the testifying expert in Chavis would sufficiently meet
these criteria.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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D. Segment Representative Approach
A fourth approach the Court might consider would be to require
production of at least one representative analyst for each identified
segment of a forensic process. We refer to this as the “Segment Representative Approach.”
We can imagine two versions of this approach: (1) a version based
on “discrete phases” in a forensic process (with each phase being referred to as a “segment”); or (2) a version based on a set “number of
analysts” (with such set number of analysts being referred to as a
“segment”). As to the version based on discrete phases, Justice
Breyer’s explanation of a typical DNA analysis in the appendix to his
Williams opinion may be illustrative. That analysis involved multiple
steps in preparing the suspect’s sample’s profile, multiple steps in preparing the crime scene sample’s profile, and then a step for comparison between the two profiles to reach a conclusion on whether they
match.245 The Court could identify work on the suspect’s sample as
one segment, work on the crime scene sample as a second segment,
and work on the match as a third segment. Under the discrete phases
version of the Segment Representative Approach, if the prosecution
were seeking to utilize the results of the analysis in Justice Breyer’s
appendix against an accused, the prosecution would be required to
produce at least one analyst associated with the suspect sample’s segment of the analysis, at least one associated with the crime scene sample’s segment of the analysis, and at least one analyst involved in
conducting the analysis to check for a match between the two samples.
One key challenge with this version—which might make the Court
less likely to adopt it—would be enumerating sufficient guidance on
what should constitute a segment such that the guidance would work
for the many variations of forensic processes.246 As to the number of
analysts version of the Segment Representative Approach, the Court
could, for instance, decide that a segment consisted of five forensic
analysts. This would mean that, while it would be possible for one
analyst to testify on behalf of herself and at most four other analysts,
if six analysts were involved, then at least two analysts from the group
of analysts would need to testify. The theory under this version of the
approach being that the greater the number of analysts a given analyst
is representing, the greater the likelihood that the testifying analyst
will be unable to afford an accused a sufficient opportunity to confront relevant evidence. One important challenge with this version
245. Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 99–102 (2012) (plurality opinion).
246. Connected to this, the Court may find it challenging to determine how granularly it wants to define a segment. In principle, many intermediate steps—such as
checking in a sample, preparing the sample, and interpreting relevant data—could be
considered segments. If the Court did adopt a discrete phases version of this approach, we assume the Court would seek to define segments very broadly such that
the number of analysts who must testify would be limited.
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would be setting an appropriate limit on the number of analysts constituting a segment. It would be particularly difficult to set a standing
number appropriate for the many different types of forensic tests and
analyses. The Court could attempt to fashion several standing rules
based on set criteria—such as the difficulty of the type of analysis involved, the likelihood of error for such type of analysis, and the average overall number of analysts involved in a typical analysis of like
kind—but it would be difficult for the Court to do so without resorting to the sort of case-by-case balancing we assume the Court would
generally seek to avoid.
In some ways, this Segment Representative Approach—either version—would be a related approach to the More Than Surrogate Approach since each representative analyst would be a type of “more
than surrogate” for her or his segment. Also, as in the More Than
Surrogate Approach, each representative would still need to satisfy
Court-adopted criteria to be a sufficient representative. We assume
such criteria would be similar to those we discussed in connection with
the More Than Surrogate Approach. However, the Segment Representative Approach is still distinct from the More Than Surrogate Approach. Under the discrete phases version of this approach, for
instance, an analyst who merely conducted the comparison between
two DNA profiles—without being involved in preparing either profile—could not, alone, meet the Confrontation Clause even if she otherwise met the criteria set out in our discussion of the More Than
Surrogate Approach. Similarly, under the number of analysts version
of this approach, an analyst who met all the criteria, but who was only
one of ten analysts involved in the analysis—assuming the Court set a
limit of five analysts for a segment—could not meet the Confrontation
Clause.
In practice, under either version of this approach, it is still possible
that a single individual could be a sufficient representative and that
such expert’s testimony alone could be sufficient. For instance, under
the discrete phases version, the expert in Chavis seems to have been
involved in each segment of the relevant DNA analysis—assuming the
Court defined the segments as suspect’s sample, crime scene sample,
and match. If such expert could have fully satisfied the other Courtadopted criteria—which it is not clear to us she could—her testimony
alone might have been sufficient. Under the number of analysts version, if there were only four total individuals involved in an analysis—
and assuming the Court had set a limit of five analysts for a segment
and all other criteria were met—one analyst alone could be sufficient.
Consistent with our recommendation under the More Than Surrogate Approach, the best way to make this approach workable would
be for the Court to set out clear criteria as to what would constitute a
relevant segment—either discrete phases of a process or a set number
of analysts—and also as to who will be a sufficient testifying represen-
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tative. Labs could use the criteria to pre-designate segment representatives, and other local stakeholders could likewise use it to better
prepare.
E. Important Analyst Approach
A fifth approach the Court might consider would be to require production of only the most important analyst or analysts. We refer to
this as the “Important Analyst Approach.”
We believe that there are at least two ways that importance could
be judged. First, the Court could seek to set out in the abstract what
roles in a forensic process would be deemed important. Under this
version of the approach, we suspect that the Court would assign importance based on the general significance of individual roles in forensic analysis. We assume, for instance, that the most likely candidates
for general importance would be the first and last analysts in a forensic chain. The last analyst in a chain—like the testifying analyst in
Chavis—may be the most obvious example of an important witness
since she is the one actually responsible for the match between the
profiles from the accused and the crime scene.247 Without her match,
the analysis of the other analysts would not have much value in a case.
Interim analysts, in contrast, would likely not be deemed important
because they may generally be involved with mere chain of custody or
other intermediate processes. However, chain of custody is still important to a case because if the two samples are not from the crime scene
and the accused, respectively, the ultimate analyst’s conclusion as to
any match is meaningless. As such, we suspect that the Court would
also deem the first analyst in a chain important. Perhaps the Court
could set a presumption that the first and last analysts in a chain are
important and then afford the defendant the right to demonstrate that
other analysts in the specific process involved were also important.
Under a second version of the Important Analyst Approach, the
Court could decide that, rather than setting out a presumption as to
which analysts would be important in the abstract, a specific determination should be made in each individual case based on the specific
process and facts involved. This might entail looking at various factors
in the specific case, such as which analysts’ statements feature prominently or which statements are more central to the specific case. We
assume, however, that the Court might disfavor such a case-by-case
approach.
For any version of this approach, it would be extremely helpful if
the Supreme Court could offer clear guidance on which analyst or
analysts would be deemed important. Clear guidance is especially
helpful in the context of this approach since “important” may be seen
247. Chavis v. Delaware, 227 A.3d 1079, 1083–86 (Del. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 1528 (2021).
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as an even more subjective concept than those described in connection with certain other of our approaches.
F. Actual Evidence Approach
A sixth approach the Court might consider is to determine what is
the actual evidence at issue in a given case: the testifying expert or the
work of other analysts who are not produced. We refer to this as the
“Actual Evidence Approach.”
Under this approach, a court would need to determine what the
evidence really is. This could be accomplished by, for instance, asking
who is predominantly speaking in the case. In making this determination, the Court would likely need to adopt a set of factors to consider,
some of which may be like those suggested in connection with the
More Than Surrogate Approach. First, the Court might consider how
much independent judgment the testifying expert put into her opinion. Second, the Court might consider how much actual participation
the expert witness had in the forensic process. Third, the Court could
consider whether the report itself is being offered, or if not, whether
material from the report that the testifying expert would not personally know will be extensively mentioned. Fourth, the Court might consider the degree to which the offered testimony—or final argument—
rests upon material in the report that the testifying expert does not
personally know. Fifth, and finally, the Court could consider how
much independent evidence the prosecution offers on the material
from the report that the testifying expert does not personally know.248
The prime downside to this approach is that a case-by-case, balancing determination is all but assured, and it would be rather indeterminate and somewhat unpredictable how a court would come out. Even
so, perhaps criteria would evolve.
Before closing, we note that our six approaches are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, and the Court could choose to fashion a rule that
utilizes more than one such approach or combines approaches.249 We
also want to emphasize that the Court may find certain legal rights or
principles cut across or underlie more than one of our approaches.
Particularly, consider the following three. First, the right to compul248. For instance, a testifying expert—such as the one in Chavis—might not have
personal knowledge of the source of the original samples from the accused and the
crime scene. If the prosecution does not offer much independent evidence of such
items in the report, then the prosecution would be seen as relying primarily upon the
report (i.e., the non-testifying analysts’ statements) to prove them (i.e., for their
truth), rather than as mere assumptions of the testifying expert (i.e., mere hypotheticals) in illuminating the testifying expert’s own independent opinion.
249. For example, if the Court were to adopt one of our approaches that would
require at least certain specific analysts to attend (such as our “Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach”), it might also want to adopt an approach that allows for the contingency that a substitute may be needed for one of the required
analysts (such as our “More Than Surrogate Approach”). See infra Part IV.A, IV.C.
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sory process is found in the U.S. Constitution’s Compulsory Process
Clause, which ensures that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.”250 In theory, the Court could determine that
excusing certain witnesses in a forensic chain is justifiable because the
defendant might retain the right to call such witnesses pursuant to the
Compulsory Process Clause.251 The Court has previously found that
the defendant’s compulsory process right to subpoena a witness does
not excuse the prosecution from producing the witness under the Confrontation Clause. However, assuming at least certain sufficient analysts need to be produced under one of our six approaches, the Court
could theoretically find that the compulsory process right justifies not
requiring production of additional witnesses in a forensic chain. Second, the principle of formality may cut across or underlie our approaches. Certain leading cases have referenced formality of the
offered statement as indicia of “testimoniality,” as evinced most
prominently in Justice Thomas’s opinions.252 It may be that the Court
finds certain types of witnesses—such as witnesses playing extremely
limited or tangential roles in forensic tests—do not provide sufficiently formal statements such that they need to testify. Third, and
finally, consider the principle of unavailability. As previously noted,
Crawford stands for the proposition that a non-testifying declarant’s
testimonial statements are admitted only “where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine.”253 Drawing upon the principle of unavailability, the
Court could condition use of one or more of our approaches on some
finding of analyst unavailability. This might mean that any such approach could only be used if certain analysts in the chain are not available to testify.254 For instance, the Court might determine that all
analysts in a forensic chain must generally testify, but if certain analysts are unavailable, use of the “More Than Surrogate Approach” or
“Segment Representative Approach” would then become justified.
The Court could also go further and excuse witnesses even if our approaches would otherwise require their production if the prosecution
could show genuine unavailability of witnesses. However, we do not
believe the Court would find unavailability excuses all analysts, and

250. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
251. See Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (“Respondent
asserts that we should find no Confrontation Clause violation in this case because
petitioner had the ability to subpoena the analysts. But that power—whether pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process Clause—is no substitute for the right of
confrontation.”).
252. See supra Part II.
253. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004); supra Part II.
254. See infra Part IV.C, IV.D.
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we think the prosecution would still need to produce a critical mass of
sufficient analysts.255
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to identify and discuss six plausible
approaches the U.S. Supreme Court may consider in addressing the
multi-analyst problem. Since we assume the Court would prefer not to
have all analysts testify—and indeed, would prefer to minimize the
number of analysts required—we suspect that the approaches we have
suggested in this Article are the most plausible. If we had to speculate
which of these six approaches the Court would be most likely to prefer, we believe some form of the Interim Communications Not Testimonial Approach would be favored.
Requiring any forensic analyst to testify may be burdensome for
labs and law enforcement, and increasing the number of analysts required for testimony would correspondingly compound the difficulty.256 Nevertheless, the degree of confrontation afforded
defendants by the Constitution cannot necessarily turn upon cost or
convenience. Courts and commentators have suggested means of mitigating the burden on law enforcement when forensic analysts must
appear, such as use of notice-and-demand statutes, retesting, or even
video testimony.257 We believe that one of the most important things
the Supreme Court could do would be to set some guidance on which
analyst within the multi-analyst chain must testify. If courts, labs, and
local stakeholders know an approach in advance of trial, this should
help reduce costs and uncertainty or at least allow relevant stakeholders to be better prepared. As Justice Gorsuch expressed more generally about confrontation rights in forensics cases post-Williams, the
Court “owe[s] lower courts struggling to abide our holdings more clarity than we have afforded them.”258
255. Although compulsory process, formality, and unavailability could each theoretically underlie separate approaches, we have not presented them as such since we
find them less plausible as standalone approaches than the other six. In particular,
because we find it unlikely that the Court would excuse all analysts consistent with
Crawford and the Melendez–Diaz Trilogy, we still think a separate approach would be
needed to determine which type and how many witnesses must testify. Accordingly,
we think compulsory process, formality, and unavailability are best considered as potential glosses on an approach rather than the approach itself.
256. See, e.g., Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. 305, 332–33 (2009); A Game of Katso and
Mouse, supra note 4, at 35–36; Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 5, at 552–56.
257. See generally Eli Scott, Confrontation Compromise: How Modern State Rules
of Evidence Could Ensure Transparent Forensic Reports, 56 CRIM. L. BULL. 2, 2
(2020); see also A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 4, at 37 n.97 (discussing
notice-and-demand statutes and retesting); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S.
665–67 (2011) (same); Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326–27 (discussing notice-and-demand statutes); Arons, supra note 5, at 733–36 (discussing, among other things, notice-and-demand statutes and video recording).
258. Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 37 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

